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Abstract  This paper discusses German adverbials such as absichtlich ‘intention-
ally’ and freiwillig ‘voluntarily’ to gain deeper insights into the intricate interac-
tion of compositional semantics and conceptual structures. The case study reveals 
the impact of conceptual knowledge on the adverbial’s interpretation and, more-
over, how lexical semantics may curb the impact of conceptual knowledge. 
Based on the compositional interpretation of the adverbials, this paper argues 
against an underspecification analysis and proposes a coercion analysis spelled 
out in Asher’s (2011) Type Composition Logic.  
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1  Introduction  
The principle of compositionality has proven to be key to the combinatorial nature 
of linguistic meaning (e.g. Pagin & Westerståhl 2011). However, the conception 
of strict compositionality is challenged by an increasing amount of evidence that 
natural language interpretation is strikingly sensitive to conceptual structures and 
thus goes beyond a meaning construction purely based on grammar (e.g. Asher 
2011): the interpretation of a complex expression may allow us to exploit infor-
mation from context and world knowledge to adhere to the selectional restrictions 
of predicates. Relevant phenomena of meaning adjustments raise the question of 
how the reliable idea of compositionality can be reconciled with the impact of 
conceptual structures.  
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As a case in point, I will discuss German mental attitude adverbials (= MAAs) 
such as absichtlich ‘intentionally’ and freiwillig ‘voluntarily’. Roughly, MAAs 
describe an attitude of an event participant towards the event (e.g. Wyner 1998). 
Hence, they require their compositional target to refer to an animate entity that is 
able to have attitudes. In (1), the hiker conforms to this restriction and is interpret-
ed as the attitude holder. I refer to this reading as compositional interpretation.  
(1) a.  Der  Wanderer  liegt  absichtlich  im  Schatten.  
   the  hiker  lies  intentionally  in.the  shade 
 b.  Der  Wanderer  liegt  freiwillig  im  Schatten.  
   the  hiker  lies  voluntarily  in.the  shade 
In (2), die Picknickdecke ‘the picnic blanket’ does not comply with the selec-
tional restrictions of the MAAs. The disjunct properties of inanimate artifacts and 
attitude holders undermine a straightforward compositional interpretation of (2).  
(2) a.   Die  Picknickdecke  liegt  absichtlich  im  Schatten.  
    the  picnic blanket  lies  intentionally  in.the  shade 
 b.  * Die  Picknickdecke  liegt  freiwillig  im  Schatten.  
     the  picnic blanket  lies  voluntarily  in.the  shade 
However, as already noted by Eckardt (2003: 264), Pittner (2004: 284, fn. 12) 
and Dowty (2007: 62, fn. 29), a suitable attitude holder can be inferred to adhere 
to the semantic requirements of absichtlich ‘intentionally’. In (2a), the intention is 
preferentially ascribed to the person who put the picnic blanket in the shade. I 
refer to this reading as the adjusted interpretation since it includes some meaning 
parts that are determined by conceptual knowledge. (2b) does not allow us to infer 
the attitude holder although conceptual knowledge would support the putative 
interpretation. As in (2a), it is just as plausible that the person who put the picnic 
blanket in the shade has the relevant will. The interpretation of (2b) fails since the 
semantic requirements of freiwillig ‘voluntarily’ could not be fulfilled, neither 
compositionally nor pragmatically. With regard to this contrast, this paper tackles 
three questions: (Q1) To what extent does compositionality actually determine the 
identification of the attitude holder? (Q2) How is the exploitation of conceptual 
knowledge licensed and restricted? (Q3) How can we account for the sensitivity 
to conceptual knowledge while preserving some version of compositionality?
1
  
                                                 
1
  This phenomenon shows up in several languages. As indicated by native speakers, the outlined 
contrast also holds in Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, French, Hungarian, 
Italian, Polish, Russian, Slovenian, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish; see Buscher 2018 for transla-
tions. Although this issue will not be touched upon in this paper and a more thorough discussion 
of fine-grained differences between certain languages must be tackled, my proposal is applicable 
to other languages in general. Notably, the lexicalist perspective underlying my analysis is well 
equipped to capture fine-grained differences between languages. 
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In contemporary linguistics, two approaches conceive of meaning adjustments 
as instances of underspecification or coercion. The first captures meaning adjust-
ments by a semantic structure that is underspecified in parts and thus allows for a 
pragmatic specification of particular meaning components (e.g. Blutner 1998; Egg 
2005; Dölling 2005). Semantic underspecification occurs because either the lexi-
cal semantics of an item leaves its target argument underspecified or the composi-
tional combination of particular items is systematically accompanied by the inser-
tion of an underspecified variable. The potential to exploit conceptual knowledge 
is thus built into the semantic structure in advance. In contrast, the coercion ap-
proach conceives of meaning adjustments as irregular reinterpretations that are 
triggered by semantic conflicts arising in incompatible meaning structures (e.g. 
Asher 2011; Pustejovsky 2011). The conflict is solved by a linguistic adaptation 
mechanism that paves the way for exploiting on conceptual knowledge to save the 
interpretation of the conflicting terms. The potential to adjust the meaning is thus 
added in individual cases that require for it. I use the term meaning adjustment in 
a rather neutral way without relating it a priori to a particular theoretical approach. 
Section 2 outlines the compositional interpretation of MAAs. It shows that the 
identification of the attitude holder is not underspecified, but strictly determined 
in terms of composition, cf. (Q1). Section 3 collates the core traits of the adjusted 
interpretation and thereby reveals the factors that license and restrict the meaning 
adjustment of MAAs, cf. (Q2). Section 4 spells out a coercion analysis in terms of 
Asher’s (2011) type composition logic, cf. (Q3).  
2  Compositional interpretation of German mental attitude adverbials 
2.1  Lexical semantics 
Previous accounts analyzing the compositional interpretation of MAAs treat 
MAAs as a homogeneous class. Basically, MAAs are assumed to describe the 
attitude of an event participant towards the event introduced by the verbal predi-
cate (e.g. Croft 1984; Wyner 1998; McKercher 2002; Schäfer 2005; Landman 
2000). This assumption is too coarse-grained. If MAAs only described an attitude, 
the putative interpretation of (3) should be fine: it is plausible that the animate 
participant has an intention or a will according to which the event should occur.  
(3) a.  * Der Astronom  hat  absichtlich   / freiwillig  einen Planeten entdeckt. 
     the   astronomer  has  intentionally /  voluntarily a         planet    discovered  
 b.  *Der Lektor  hat  absichtlich   / freiwillig   einen  Tippfehler  bemerkt. 
     the   editor    has   intentionally /  voluntarily  a          typing.error  noted  
 c.  *Die Frau     hat  absichtlich   / freiwillig   ihr  Baby  geboren. 
     the   woman  has  intentionally /  voluntarily  her  baby   given.birth  
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Based on the oddness of these data, Buscher (2013, 2018) argues for a more 
complex semantics of MAAs and shows that MAAs can be divided into two lexi-
cal subclasses. The lexical entry proposed for absichtlich ‘intentionally’ illustrates 
the first subtype, i.e. intentional adverbials. The lexical entry proposed for frei-
willig ‘voluntarily’ illustrates the second subtype, i.e. assimilative adverbials.2 
(4) ⟦absichtlich⟧ =                                                              [preliminary version] 
λP λx λe ∃r ∃z ∃e'.P(e)(x) ˄ intention(r, z, x, ^P) ˄ bearing(z, x) ˄                
 initiation(e', x, e) ˄ ∃T [Q = P ˄ Q∈C ˄ [(T ⊂ C) <intended Q]] / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
(5) ⟦freiwillig⟧ =                                                                 [preliminary version] 
λP λx λe ∃r ∃z ∃e'.P(e)(x) ˄ will(r, z, x, ^P) ˄ bearing(z, x) ˄                   
control(e', x, e) ˄ ∃T [Q = P ˄ Q∈C ˄ [Q <preferred (T ⊂ C)]] / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
The implementation of attitudes in an event semantic approach is notoriously 
challenging. In (4) and (5), the attitudes are not captured via propositions for on-
tological reasons. Building on the idea of Attitudinal Objects (Moltmann 2013), 
Buscher (2018) argues that attitudes such as intentions and wills ontologically 
must be categorized as quasi-relational tropes, i.e. as concrete property manifesta-
tions in an individual. This classification complies with their crucial features (e.g. 
perceptibility, causal effects, internal structure, variability, restricted integration 
of individuals); in particular, with the notion that attitudes are anchored in time 
via the corrsponding bearerhood. Hence, in (4) and (5), the attitude is captured by 
a quasi-relational trope r that is specified by the target x and the content P (e.g. 
intention r that x has the property P). Following Landman (2000), the scope of the 
intensional operator ^ captures that MAAs create an opaque context for their con-
tent P but not for their target x as noted by Thomason & Stalnaker (1973). Build-
ing on the analysis of simple tropes sketched by Maienborn (2015), r is related to 
its bearer x via a Kimian state z.
3
 Thus, due to the bearing relation, x is defined as 
the attitude holder. Since the relations are added conjunctively, (4) and (5) capture 
that MAAs are veridical (cf. Landman 2000). Wyner (1994: 172) and Ernst (2002: 
64) noted the interpretational restriction that the attitude holder must have the 
described attitude while the event proceeds. This restriction is captured by a pre-
supposition (encoded by /): the time of e must be part of the time of z. That is, the 
state z of having an intention is anchored in time, not the intention r itself. The 
presupposition captures that the attitude may already exist before the described 
                                                 
2
  In the following, I will outline my core assumptions concerning the lexical semantics of MAAs, 
which provide the starting point for my analysis of the meaning adjustment. Due to space limits 
these assumptions cannot be motivated in detail; see Buscher 2018 for an in-depth discussion. 
3
  According to Maienborn (2005), abstract Kimian states (introduced by copula verbs) are exem-
plifications of a property at a bearer. In contrast to Davidsonian states, which comply with the 
ontological traits of events, Kimian states are only anchored in time, but not in space. 
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event actually proceeds; for instance, in (1a), the hiker may have the intention to 
lie in the shade before he actually lies in the shade.  
Attitudes introduced by intentional adverbials (= I-adverbials, e.g. absichtlich 
‘intentionally’, vorsorglich ‘precautionarily’, bewusst ‘consciously’) are inherent-
ly related to the goals of the attitude holder. Moreover, I-adverbials express that 
the event e was initiated by x (encoded by an initiation event e'). That is, follow-
ing Farkas (1988), the attitude holder x is established as the initiator of e. The 
initiator corresponds to the individual who gave the decisive impetus to the event 
by making a relevant decision and in this sense, is responsible for the event. The 
focus sensitivity of I-adverbials is encoded by an interpretative constraint estab-
lishing semantic access to a set of alternatives for the property P (cf. Rooth 1992). 
It states that P is part of a set C of contextually relevant properties (see also 
Landman 2000) and C also includes an alternative T that is less intended than P. C 
and T are determined by focus structure and conceptual knowledge. In sum, based 
on (4), the compositional interpretation of (1a) can be paraphrased as ‘There is an 
event where the hiker lies in the shade. At the same time, there is a state in which 
the hiker who initiated the event has the intention that he has the property of lying 
in the shade whereby this property is more intended than a contextually relevant 
alternative.’ The alternative can be specified as, for instance, lying in the sun.
4
 
Attitudes introduced by assimilative adverbials (= A-adverbials, e.g. freiwillig 
‘voluntarily’, bereitwillig ‘willingly’, widerwillig ‘reluctantly’) are inherently 
related to the attitude holder’s willingness to participate in the event. Moreover, 
A-adverbials express that the event e was controlled by x (encoded by the control 
event e' adopted from Engelberg 2000). That is, the attitude holder x is established 
as the controller of e. The controller corresponds to the individual who controlled 
the beginning of the event by his own actions (cf. Engelberg 2000). The constraint 
capturing the focus sensitivity states that P is part of a set of contextually relevant 
properties and C also includes an alternative T that is more preferred than P. In 
sum, based on (5), (1b) can be paraphrased as ‘There is an event where the hiker 
lies in the shade. At the same time, there is a state in which the hiker who con-
trolled the event has the will that he has the property of lying in the shade where-
by this property is less preferred than a contextually relevant alternative.’  
                                                 
4
  More precisely, I-adverbials must be divided into two subtypes (Buscher 2018): The first sub-
type (e.g. absichtlich ‘intentionally’, vorsorglich ‘precautionarily’) relates to the initiation of the 
occurrence of the event: the responsible individual that had the opportunity to give the decisive 
impetus to the occurrence of the event actually initiated the event. The second subtype (e.g. 
versehentlich ‘inadvertently’, unabsichtlich ‘unintentionally’) relates to the initiation of the 
avoidance of the event: roughly, the responsible individual that had the opportunity to avoid the 
event did not avoid it. Moreover, in contrast to the first subtype, the second subtype states that 
the contextually relevant alternative T was more intended than P. Both subtypes allow the mean-
ing adjustment outlined in Section 1. Due to space limits, I focus on the first subtype. However, 
the proposed coercion analysis applies analogously to the second subtype. 
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Consequently, I-adverbials and A-adverbials require their compositional target 
x to be able to have attitudes and, moreover, to be the initiator or controller of the 
event. They select for an event that can be initiated or controlled. The examples in 
(3) are odd since the events do not comply with these restrictions. For example, a 
discovery is made accidentally; it cannot be initiated or controlled by x.
5
 
The question whether an event is assumed to be initiated and/or controlled is 
not determined by the lexical semantics of the verb, but by conceptual knowledge 
(Engelberg 2000; Farkas 1988).
6
 For instance, a sentence like The hiker is lying in 
the shade. is felicitous when the hiker decided to lie in the shade (= initiation) and 
lay down in the shade (= control), but it is also felicitous when the hiker fell 
asleep and lay in the shade due to the movement of the sun. Initiation and control 
do not necessarily correlate with agentivity, cf. (6a). Due to lexical semantics, 
backen ‘bake’ describes an agentive action. However, conceptual knowledge as-
sociated with (6a) reveals that the described event was not initiated by the sleep-
walker; the sleepwalker was not able to decide to bake a cake. Thus, in contrast to 
(6b), a modification of this event by absichtlich ‘intentionally’ is odd. This con-
trast provides first evidence that the selectional restrictions of MAAs are sensitive 
to dynamic conceptual knowledge; see also (17), (18) and (28) below.         
(6) a.  * Der  Schlafwandler hat absichtlich   einen  Kirschkuchen gebacken. 
     the  sleepwalker   has  intentionally   a  cherry.pie  baked 
 b.   Der  Gastgeber   hat  absichtlich   einen  Kirschkuchen  gebacken.    
    the host   has  intentionally   a  cherry.pie  baked 
2.2  Compositional identification of the target argument  
Previous accounts describe the compositional identification of the target argument 
in dependence on syntactic functions, thematic roles or argument hierarchy: the 
attitude holder corresponds to the subject (e.g. McConnell-Ginet 1982), the agent 
(e.g. Wyner 1998) or the highest ranked argument (e.g. Frey & Pittner 1998; Frey 
2003). For German MAAs, these analyses must be refined:  
(7) a.  dass  ein  Schüler  versehentlich  einschlief 
   that  a studentsubject  inadvertently  fell asleep 
 b.  dass  einem Schüler  versehentlich  eine  Information  entging 
   that a studentindirect object inadvertently  a  informationsubject  missed 
 c.  dass  einem  Lehrer   versehentlich  ein  Schüler  einschlief 
   that   the    teacherfree dative  inadvertently  a studentsubject  fell asleep 
                                                 
5
  Wyner (1998) explains the oddness of examples like (3) by the assumption that the attitude 
holder is restricted to a volitional agent. This explanation does not hold for German, cf. (7). 
6
  Some verbs actually determine that the described event is initiated and/or controlled; cf. e.g. 
ermorden ‘murder’ in contrast to töten ‘kill’. 
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German MAAs may relate to subjects, cf. (1), (6b), (7a), indirect objects, cf. 
(7b), and free datives, cf. (7c). Thus, they may relate to arguments corresponding 
to agents, cf. (6b), themes, cf. (1), and experiencers, cf. (7a), (7b), as well as to 
DPs lacking argument status, cf. (7c). Moreover, the contrast between (7a) and 
(7c) provides evidence that the target argument is not lexically underspecified. If 
the target were underspecified and identified by conceptual knowledge, it should 
be possible to interpret the student as the attitude holder in (7a) as well as in (7c). 
However, in (7c), only the teacher can be interpreted as the attitude holder. The 
identification of the attitude holder thus does not depend solely on conceptual 
knowledge, but is obviously determined by grammar: the compositional target of 
MAAs is identified with the next DP integrated above the adverbial, i.e. based on 
relative minimal c-command; see Buscher (2018) for details.
7
 Hence, the meaning 
adjustment of MAAs, (2a), is not based on lexically anchored underspecification.
 
 
2.3  Syntactic adjunction site  
With regard to the compositional interpretation, Frey & Pittner (1998) and Frey 
(2003) have shown that German MAAs have a base position above the internal 
argument and below the highest argument of the main predicate, cf. (8). Buscher 
(2018) verifies this analysis for both subtypes by several empirical studies.
8
 
(8) dass [VP [DP der Wanderer] [V’ [AP absichtlich] [V’ [PP im Schatten] Vliegt]]]  
(9) dass [VP [DP die Decke] [V’ [AP absichtlich] [V’ [PP im Schatten] Vliegt]]] 
Eckardt (2003: 264f.) and Pittner (2004: 284, fn. 12) suggest that the meaning 
adjustment of MAAs correlates to a high adjunction site above the highest ranked 
argument. Based on this assumption, it could be explained by underspecification 
resulting from combinatorics: in the position above all verb arguments, the target 
argument cannot be identified with a DP integrated above the adverbial and thus 
remains underspecified. Accordingly, the availability of the meaning adjustment 
depends on the syntactic configuration and is predictable in terms of composition. 
However, the assumption that MAAs can be base-generated in a second, rather 
high position has not been verified (Buscher 2018): the results of well-established 
                                                 
7
  The options of relating to free datives or the subject of an unaccusative verb are restricted by 
certain independent factors, as for example the various adjunction sites of free datives and the 
movement of the internal argument in a higher position, respectively; see Buscher (2018).  
8
  English MAAs are analyzed as sentence adverbials (e.g. Parsons 1990) and/or VP adverbials 
(e.g. Wyner 1994, 1998, Landman 2000). Although the grammatical traits of German and Eng-
lish MAAs overlap significantly, they do not match exactly. For instance, in contrast to English 
MAAs, German MAAs are not passive sensitive: independent of the adverbial’s surface position, 
the agent is interpreted as the attitude holder, but not the subject referent, cf. (ii).  
 (ii)  dass  der  Junge  (bereitwillig)  von  dem  Arzt     (bereitwillig)  untersucht  wurde 
   that   the  boy     (willingly)       by   the    doctor  (willingly)      examined   was 
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diagnostics (based on sentential negation, focus projection, existentially interpret-
ed w-phrases, remnant topicalization), three questionnaire studies and an auditory 
study provide strong evidence that the meaning adjustment does not depend on a 
high base position or a high placement of the adverbial in the surface structure. 
Regardless of their interpretation, MAAs are integrated as V'-adjuncts, cf. (9).  
In sum, the question whether the meaning adjustment of MAAs should be 
captured as instances of underspecification or coercion is not a question of theo-
retical preferences. The restrictions identified with regard to the compositional 
identification of the target and the syntactic integration of MAAs are incompatible 
with the assumption that the meaning adjustment is based on underspecification. 
For this reason, I propose a coercion analysis in Section 4. Previously, I will pre-
sent some core observations that an appropriate analysis should strive to capture. 
3  Core characteristics of the adjusted interpretation 
3.1  Dependence on lexical items 
The availability of the adjusted interpretation is quite restricted, cf. (10) and (11). 
(10) Die  Picknickdecke liegt  absichtlich  / vorsorglich     / bewusst  im Schatten. 
 the  picnic blanket    lies    intentionally / precautionarily /  willfully  in.the shade 
(11) *Die Picknickdecke liegt freiwillig  / bereitwillig / widerwillig im Schatten. 
   the   picnic blanket    lies   voluntarily / willingly      /  reluctantly    in.the shade 
As already mentioned, in (11), the adjusted interpretation is not precluded by 
conceptual implausibility. The (non-)availability of meaning adjustment thus must 
be rooted in the linguistic system. Based on the independently motivated subclas-
sification of MAAs, it can be related to the subtypes: I-adverbials systematically 
permit a pragmatic identification of the attitude holder; A-adverbials adhere to a 
compositional interpretation. Regardless of plausibility, conceptual resources are 
not able to add further interpretation options that are not licensed by the adverbial.  
3.2  Non-destructive and local operation 
The meaning adjustment does not destroy the standard meaning of the involved 
predicates. In particular, the DP which is compositionally assigned to the adverbi-
al keeps its lexically defined meaning: in (10), die Picknickdecke ‘the picnic blan-
ket’ describes an inanimate artifact, but not an animate entity that is able to have 
attitudes. The denotation and thus the distribution of the DP is not affected by the 
meaning adjustment (diagnostics adopted from Asher 2011, 2015; Asher & Luo 
2012): (i) The DP can be modified by adjectives describing physical properties of 
artifacts, but not by adjectives describing cognitive skills, cf. (12). (ii) The DP is 
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compatible with verbs describing physical changes of inanimate artifacts, but not 
with verbs describing actions of animate entities, cf. (13). (iii) Explicit quantifica-
tion targets the artifact: (14) describes how many blankets are lying in the shade 
and leaves the amount of attitude holders undetermined.  
(12) Die  löchrige  / *kluge  Picknickdecke  liegt  absichtlich  im  Schatten. 
 the  holey  /   smart  picnic blanket  lies  intentionally  in.the  shade 
(13) Die  Decke  lag  versehentlich  in der Sonne und  verblich  /  *schlief ein. 
 the   blanket  lay    inadvertently    in the  sun       and   faded       /    fell asleep  
(14) Alle  / drei  Picknickdecken  liegen  absichtlich  im  Schatten. 
 all  / three  picnic blankets  lie  intentionally  in.the  shade 
The meaning adjustment operates locally and does not affect the overall com-
position. In particular, it does not disturb the computation of the target argument 
and the verbal predicate: in (10), the picnic blanket is lying in the shade, not the 
inferred attitude holder. Moreover, the interpretation of the attitude is not affected. 
The meaning adjustment preserves the DP which is compositionally assigned to 
the adverbial as the target of the attitude: the inferred attitude holder has the inten-
tion that the blanket (not he himself) has the property of lying in the shade. The 
DP is not shifted to the content of the attitude; it is thus interpreted extensionally:  
(15) a.  Max sagt, dass die Picknickdecke absichtlich  im      Schatten liegt.  
   Max  says  that   the picnic blanket    intentionally in.the  shade       lies  
 b.  Die Picknickdecke ist Pias  Geburtstagsgeschenk. 
   the   picnic blanket    is  Pia’s  birthday present 
 c.   Max sagt, dass Pias Geburtstagsgeschenk absichtlich  im    S. liegt. 
        Max  says  that   Pia’s birthday present            intentionally in.the s. lies 
Hence, the impact of conceptual knowledge is well restricted to certain parts: 
it only affects the interpretation of the initiation relation and the bearing relation.  
3.3  Preservation of lexical restrictions 
The meaning adjustment cannot overrule the meaning contribution of I-adverbials 
and the restrictions introduced by the lexical semantics of I-adverbials:  
(i) The inferred attitude holder cannot be identified arbitrarily with any indi-
vidual available in the context, but is restricted to the initiator of the event. In a 
context such as (16), (10) does not allow the interpretation that Paula is the atti-
tude holder since she is not the initiator. Maria gave the decisive impetus to the 
lying of the picnic blanket and thus must be identified as the attitude holder.  
(16) [Context: on a hot summer day, Maria prepared a picnic in the park. When 
she had finished, Paula joined her and sat down on the picnic blanket.]   
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(ii) The event has to be initiated. Otherwise, cf. (17), the combination with an 
I-adverbial and thus a meaning adjustment is precluded for independent reasons. 
Again, the selectional restrictions of I-adverbials are sensitive to conceptual 
knowledge: if the context makes clear that the described event can be considered 
as initiated, cf. (18), modification by an I-adverbial is permitted and the meaning 
adjustment succeeds: the painter who was able to initiate the sinister appearance 
of the sky is identified as the attitude holder.  
(17) [Context: two persons are talking about today’s weather.]   
  *Der  Himmel  wirkt  absichtlich  sehr  düster. 
     the   sky  appears  intentionally  very  sinister 
(18) [Context: C. D. Friedrich is talking about his painting The monk by the sea.]  
    Der   Himmel  wirkt  absichtlich  sehr  düster. 
     the     sky  appears  intentionally  very  sinister 
Provided that the event can be conceptualized as initiated, the meaning ad-
justment may occur in sentences with verbs denoting both stative and dynamic 
events, cf. (19). The meaning adjustment does not depend on certain verb classes. 
(19) a.  Der  Wecker  hat  vorsorglich  um  6 Uhr  geklingelt. 
   the  alarm clock  has  precautionarily  at  6 o’clock  rung 
 b.  Der  Fußball  hat  versehentlich  die  Fensterscheibe  zerbrochen. 
   the  soccer.ball  has  inadvertently  the  window.pane  broken 
(iii) A plausible alternative that is less intended than the property described by 
V' must be available. (20a) is odd since apple trees are usually in gardens. With-
out further context information, no alternative to this standard case is plausible. In 
contrast, (20b) is fine since it is plausible that the tree’s location in the front gar-
den is more intended than, for example, an alternative location in the back garden.  
(20) [Context: two neighbors are talking about their gardens.]  
Der  Apfelbaum  steht   absichtlich ...  a. ?? im Garten.    b. im Vorgarten.  
 the   apple tree      stands  intentionally …          in.the garden      in.the front garden 
In sum, the restrictions introduced by the lexical semantics of I-adverbials de-
termine the adapted interpretation just as the compositional interpretation.  
3.4  Flexible identification of the attitude holder 
The pragmatic identification of the initiator and thus of the attitude holder is de-
termined by dynamic conceptual structures. World knowledge associated locally 
with an expression usually allows for a default specification. In (21), the infor-
mation that it is Pia’s blanket suggests that Pia is the initiator of the event since 
the owner usually decides what is going to happen to his blanket. In (10), due to 
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the lack of detailed information, world knowledge only suggests that the initiator 
corresponds to the person who put the blanket into the shade. In a context as (22), 
this allows the inference that Maria is the initiator and thus the attitude holder.  
(21) Die  Picknickdecke  von  Pia  liegt  absichtlich  im  Schatten. 
 the  picnic blanket  from  Pia  lies  intentionally  in.the  shade 
(22) [Context: On a hot summer day, Maria prepared a picnic in the park. As 
always, she was afraid of getting sunburned.]   
However, local default specifications can be overruled by rather global con-
text information. In a context like (23), (21) requires the interpretation that Paula 
is the attitude holder since the context promotes the assumption that Paula decided 
where Pia’s blanket should lie and thus is the initiator. In a context like (24), (10) 
requires the interpretation that Sue is the attitude holder since she instructed Maria 
to put the blanket into the shade and thus gave the decisive impetus to the event. 
(23) [On a hot summer day, Paula prepared a picnic in the park. As always, she 
was afraid that her daughter Pia would get sunburned.]   
(24) [On a hot summer day, Sue prepared a picnic in the park. She instructed her 
daughter Maria to put the picnic blanket in the shade.]  
3.5  Semantic and conceptual trigger 
The meaning adjustment can be triggered by semantic incompatibilities, see the 
example with the picnic blanket, but also by conceptual incompatibilities, cf. (25): 
(25) Der  Patient  liegt  vorsorglich  auf  der  Intensivstation. 
 the  patient  lies  precautionarily  on  the  intensive care unit  
Der Patient ‘the patient’ denotes an entity that is able to have intentions and to 
initiate events in general. Based on lexical semantics, the DP fits with the selec-
tional restrictions of I-adverbials and can serve as their compositional target, (26):  
(26) Der  Patient  verschweigt  vorsorglich  ein  Symptom. 
 the  patient  conceals  precautionarily a  symptom 
However, the initiator of an event is not necessarily an event participant (cf. 
Farkas 1988: 36). He also can give the decisive impetus to the event indirectly by 
instructing a participant. Therefore, in (25), conceptual knowledge can reveal that 
the patient is not the initiator: patients usually do not decide on their medical 
treatment; it is more plausible that the doctor is the initiator and decided to treat 
the patient in intensive care. This renders a compositional interpretation of (25) 
implausible and the meaning adjustment is triggered although the DP der Patient 
‘the patient’ is semantically compatible with the adverbial. For this reason, exam-
ples like (27) are ambiguous and the global context determines whether the com-
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positional interpretation or the adjusted interpretation is adequate.
9
 Against this 
background, (6a) actually allows the adjusted interpretation if the context reveals 
who was able to initiate the event by instructing the sleepwalker; cf. Sue in (28). 
(27) Der  Patient  schluckt  vorsorglich  Vitamin C. 
 the  patient  swallows  precautionarily vitamin C 
(28)  [Context: Sue is able to influence the actions of her sleepwalking husband.]  
Sections 3 and 4 have revealed that the impact of conceptual knowledge is 
strictly restricted by the lexical semantics of I-adverbials. At the same time, fine-
grained dynamic conceptual knowledge determines whether an event fulfills the 
requirement of an initiated event, and if so, which individual fulfills the require-
ment of an initiator. These observations call for a formal approach that integrates 
conceptual knowledge directly within a compositional set-up. Asher’s (2011) type 
composition logic (= TCL) provides a suitable framework. 
4  Modeling the meaning adjustment in a type-logical approach 
In TCL, lexical entries specify to levels: in addition to standard intensions, they 
specify fine-grained typing information about terms and their variables. These 
include type presuppositions that correspond to the selectional restrictions of a 
predicate and must be justified by the types of the respective arguments in the 
course of composition. Type presuppositions are encoded within presupposition 
parameters π; ∗ symbolizes the amendment of π by a type presupposition: 
(29) ⟦der Wanderer⟧ = λO λπ''' ∃!w.hiker(w, π'''  ∗ ARG1
hiker
: HUMAN) ˄ O(π''')(w) 
(30) ⟦die Decke⟧ = λO λπ''' ∃!w.blanket(d, π'''  ∗ ARG1
blanket
: ARTIFACT) ˄ O(π''')(d)  
(31) ⟦im Schatten lieg⟧ = λΦ λe'' λπ''.Φ(π'' ∗ ARG1
itslie
: EVTY ∗ ARG2
itslie
: PHYS-OBJ) 
(λv λπ''''.in the shade lie(e'', v, π''''))  
In (29), the term presupposes an application on an entity that is a human; w 
justifies the type HUMAN just in case that w fulfills the conditions that our concep-
tual knowledge associates with this type (e.g. cognitive skills, a certain physical 
constitution). In (30), the individual going in for d is supposed to be of the type 
                                                 
9
  In contrast, the controller is necessarily a participant of the event (cf. Engelberg 2000: 83). 
Hence, provided that the compositional target denotes an animate entity, the identification of the 
attitude holder can differ for I-adverbials and A-adverbials: in (iii), A-adverbials relate to the 
subject referent (= controller) and I-adverbials relate to an inferred initiator (dog owner, teacher).  
 (iii) a. Der  Hund  läuft    vorsorglich        / widerwillig  an  der  Leine. 
  the   dog     walks  precautionarily  / reluctantly    on  the  leash 
 b. Die  Schüler   schreiben  vorsorglich        / freiwillig    einen  Vokabeltest. 
  the   students  write         precautionarily  / voluntarily  a         vocabulary test 
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ARTIFACT. In (31), the first argument must justify the type EVENTUALITY (= EVTY) 
and the second argument must justify the type PHYSICAL OBJECT (= PHYS-OBJ). 
A straightforward implementation of the outlined selectional restrictions of 
MAAs as type presuppositions leads to the lexical entries in (32) and (33).
10
 
(32) [[absichtlich]] = λ𝔓 λΨ λe λπ.𝔓(π)(e)(Ψ) ˄ Ψ(π ∗ ARG3
intention
: ENTITY ∗ 
ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI)          
(λy λπ' ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY. intention(r, z, y, ^𝔓, π') ˄ bearing(z,y,π') 
˄ initiation(e', y, e, π') ˄ ∃T [Q = P ˄ Q∈C ˄ [(T ⊂ C) <intended Q]]) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e)  
(33) [[freiwillig]] = λ𝔓 λΨ λe λπ.𝔓(π)(e)(Ψ) ˄ Ψ(π ∗ ARG3
will
: ENTITY ∗           
ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
contol
: CONTROLLER ∗ ARG3
control
: CBC)                               
(λy λπ' ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY. will(r, z, y, ^𝔓, π') ˄ bearing(z, y, π') ˄ 
control(e', y, e, π') ˄ ∃T [Q = P ˄ Q∈C ˄ [Q <preferred (T ⊂ C)]]) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e)  
In (32), e must justify the type EVENTUALITY THAT CAN BE INITIATED (= CBI). x 
must justify three types: INITIATOR,
11
 ENTITY THAT IS ABLE TO HAVE ATTITUDES 
(= ATHA) and ENTITY.
12
 More precisely, the type presuppositions introduced by 
the initiation relation include a polymorphic initiator type ιυτ(HD(Ψ)). It encodes 
that the type justification for the second argument can actually proceed in two 
ways: (i) If the compositional target provides a type that is compatible with INITI-
ATOR, type justification is based on this type and proceeds directly via Simple 
Type Accommodation. (ii) If the compositional target does not provide a type that 
is compatible with INITIATOR, the polymorphic type allows type justification 
based on the polymorphic initiator type ιυτ(HD(Ψ)), whose value is specified in 
dependence on the head type of the compositional target Ψ. Notably, the second 
option has to be licensed by a type conflict. Each type presupposition for x can be 
traced back to the corresponding relation. For example, the restriction that x must 
be an initiator depends on the initiation relation; it does not depend on the inten-
tion relation. This captures that the bearer of an intention does not correspond to 
an initiator in general (cf. beabsichtigen ‘intend’; a person who intends something 
has an intention but did not necessarily initiate an event). Moreover, r is typed as 
ATTITUDINAL OBJECT (= ATT-OBJ), z is typed as K-STATE and e’ is typed as EVEN-
TUALITY. These type presuppositions are already bound and thus do not have any 
impact on the success of the predication. In (33), e is supposed to be of type 
                                                 
10
  Asher’s treatment of adverbial modification is different. In particular, in his account, verbs are 
not equipped with an event argument. Since this is not central to the case at hand, I adhere to 
the standard Davidsonian perspective that adverbials relate to events introduced by the verb.  
11
  The notation of this type presupposition is abbreviated. More precisely, it must be captured by 
a depending type INITIATOR(HD(e)) since an initiator always relates to a particular event; i.e. 
the concept associated with an initiator depends on the concept associated with the initiated 
event. This captures that x is actually the initiator of the described event. Accordingly, the pol-
ymorphic type must be refined as INITIATOR(HD(e), HD(Ψ)). The same holds for CONTROLLER.  
12
  This type presupposition is rather coarse-grained since an attitude can target any entity.  
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EVENTUALITY THAT CAN BE CONTROLLED (= CBC) and x must justify the types 
CONTROLLER, ENTITY THAT IS ABLE TO HAVE ATTITUDES (= ATHA) and ENTITY. 
Most importantly, the type presuppositions imposed by the control relation lack a 
polymorphic type and do not allow any flexibility in terms of type justification.   
With regard to (1a), the standard composition proceeds smoothly. The appli-
cation of (32) to (31) yields (34), and combining (34) and (29) yields (35).
13
 
(34) ⟦absichtlich im Schatten lieg⟧ = λΨ λe λπ.Ψ(π ∗ ARG1
itslie
: EVTY ∗ ARG2
itslie
: 
PHYS-OBJ) (λv λπ''''.in the shade lie(e, v, π'''')) ˄ Ψ(π ∗ ARG3
intention





: INITIATOR – ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) (λy λπ' ∃r:ATT-OBJ 
∃z:K-STATE ∃e': EVTY. intention(r, z, y, ^[λv λe''.in the shade lie(e'', v)], π') ˄           
bearing(z, y, π') ˄ initiation(e', y, e, π')) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
(35) ⟦der Wanderer absichtlich im Schatten lieg⟧ = λe λπ ∃!w ∃r:ATT-OBJ       
∃z:K-STATE ∃e': EVTY.hiker(w, π ∗ ARG1
itslie
: EVTY ∗ ARG2
itslie





: ENTITY ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – 
ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) ˄ in the shade lie(e, w, π ∗ ARG1
itslie
: EVTY ∗ ARG2
itslie
: 





: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) ˄ 
bearing(z, w, π ∗ ARG3
intention
: ENTITY ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – 
ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) ˄ initiation(e', w, e, π ∗ ARG3
intention





: INITIATOR – ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
Type presuppositions percolate as provided by λ-conversion of the parameters 
π; the type presuppositions for a variable are accumulated. According to (35), w is 
supposed to justify five types: HUMAN, PHYSICAL OBJECT, INITIATOR, ENTITY THAT 
IS ABLE TO HAVE ATTITUDES and ENTITY. Based on a type hierarchy reflecting our 
conceptual knowledge, these types are compatible and can be justified by the 
same entity. Simple Type Accommodation is licensed; the type presuppositions 
are combined via a meet operation (Asher 2011: 117) into the most specific sub-
type INITIATOR. In the same way, the type presuppositions for e (EVTY and CBI) are 
unified into the most specific subtype EVENTUALITY THAT CAN BE INITIATED. Thus 
type justification succeeds for w and e. All type presuppositions can be bound; see 
the result in (36) after existential closure of the VP’s referential event argument. 
In prose: ‘There is an event e where the hiker w lies in the shade. At the same 
time, there is a state z in which the hiker w who initiated the event e has the inten-
tion r that he has the property of lying in the shade.’ 
(36) λπ ∃e:CBI ∃!w:INITIATOR ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY. hiker(w, π) ˄ 
in the shade lie(e, w, π) ˄ initiation(e', i, e, π) ˄ intention(r, z, w, ^[λv λe''.in 
the shade lie(e'', v)], π) ˄ bearing(z, i, π) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
                                                 
13
  I simplify the computation by neglecting the interpretational constraint that captures the focus 
sensitivity. It could be easily included and would not affect the crucial points of the derivation.  
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The derivation of (1b) proceeds analogously. Again, type justification pro-
ceeds successfully via Simple Type Accommodation yielding the result in (37).  
(37) λπ ∃e:CBC ∃!w:CONTROLLER ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY. hiker(w, π) 
˄ in the shade lie(e, w, π) ˄ control(e', i, e, π) ˄ will(r, z, w, ^[λv λe''.in the 
shade lie(e'', v)], π) ˄ bearing(z, i, π) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
In prose: ‘There is an event e where the hiker w lies in the shade. At the same 
time, there is a state z in which the hiker w who controlled the event e has the will 
r that he has the property of lying in the shade.’ 
With regard to (2a), standard composition proceeds in the same way as in (1a) 
and (1b). Based on (30), (31) and (32), the derivation yields the result in (38).  
(38) ⟦die Picknickdecke absichtlich im Schatten lieg⟧ = λe λπ ∃!d ∃r:ATT-OBJ 
∃z:K-STATE ∃e': EVTY.blanket(d, π ∗ ARG1
itslie
: EVTY ∗ ARG2
itslie





: ENTITY ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – 
ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) ˄ in the shade lie(e, d, π ∗ ARG1
itslie
: EVTY ∗ ARG2
itslie
: 





: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) ˄        
bearing(z, d, π ∗ ARG3
intention
: ENTITY ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – 
ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) ˄ initiation(e', d, e, π ∗ ARG3
intention





: INITIATOR – ιυτ(HD(Ψ)) ∗ ARG3
initiation
: CBI) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
Now, d must justify the types ARTIFACT, PHYSICAL OBJECT, INITIATOR, ENTITY 
THAT IS ABLE TO HAVE ATTITUDES and ENTITY. Obviously, these demands cannot 
be fulfilled by the same entity. ARTIFACT, PHYSICAL OBJECT and ENTITY have a 
common meet and can be unified into the most specific subtype ARTIFACT. But 
ARTIFACT clashes with the residual types (cf. ARTIFACT ⊓ INITIATOR ⊓ ATHA = ⊥). 
Simple Type Accommodation and thus type justification fails. In other words, the 
derivation results in a type mismatch since the type of the compositional target 
does not justify the types required by the bearing relation and the initiation rela-
tion. A similar type mismatch arises in (2b) since the type ARTIFACT clashes with 
the types CONTROLLER and ENTITY THAT IS ABLE TO HAVE ATTITUDES. 
If types do not match, TCL provides two options: the composition may simply 
crash as in (2b). Alternatively, as in (2a), a lexically introduced polymorphic type 
may license Type Accommodation with generalized polymorphic types and thus 
adaptive operations that reconcile the type conflict, cf. (39) (cited from Asher 
2011: 225). (39) allows for interpolating an appropriate 𝐷-functor that introduces 
a new variable that mediates between the conflicting terms.  








                                         𝐷(λωλπ1ϕ(ω,π1))(π)(υ) 
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According to Asher (2011: 223), coercion occurs locally, i.e. not in the restric-
tor, but in the nuclear scope. Thus, the type presuppositions ARTIFACT, INITIATOR 
– ιυτ(BLANKET) and ATHA are transferred to the conflicting meaning parts in the 
scope and only anchored in the bearing relation and initiation relation, cf. (40).  
(40) λe:CBI λπ ∃!d ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY.blanket(d, π) ˄ in the shade lie(e, 
d, π) ˄ intention(r, z, d, ^[λv λe''.in the shade lie(e'', v)], π) ˄ bearing(z, d, π ∗
 ARG1
blanket
: ARTIFACT  ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – 
ιυτ(BLANKET)) ˄ initiation(e', d, e, π ∗ ARG1
blanket





: INITIATOR – ιυτ(BLANKET))  
Now, the terms which host the type conflict undergo abstraction (Asher 2011: 
224f.), (41).
14
 Then, an appropriate 𝐷-functor applies to the abstracted part, (42). 
(41) bearing(z, d, π ∗ ARG1
blanket
: ARTIFACT  ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR 
– ιυτ(BLANKET)) ˄ initiation(e', d, e, π ∗ ARG1
blanket





: INITIATOR – ιυτ(BLANKET)) 
= [λx λπ'.bearing(z, x, π') ˄ initiation(e', x, e, π')] (π ∗ ARG1
blanket
: ARTIFACT  ∗
 ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – ιυτ(BLANKET)) (d)  
(42) λP λv λπ'' ∃i:ιυτ(BLANKET). P(π'')(i) ˄ ϕιυτ(BLANKET)(i, v, π'') [λx λπ'. bearing(z, x, π') 
˄ initiation(e', x, e, π')] = λv λπ'' ∃i:ιυτ(BLANKET). bearing(z, i, π'') ˄ initiation(e', i, 
e, π'') ˄ ϕιυτ(BLANKET)(i, v, π'')  
The coercion functor introduces existential quantification over a new variable 
i and the interpolation of i is reflected by the introduction of an additional under-
specified relation ϕιυτ(BLANKET)(i, v, π''). Notably, i is typed as ιυτ(BLANKET). That is, 
i corresponds to an initiator that is related to a blanket: i made a decision regard-
ing the blanket and thus initiated an event including the blanket as participant. 
Thus, ιυτ(BLANKET) captures the dependency relation between the required type 
INITIATOR and the given type BLANKET. As a result of this step, cf. (42), the bear-
ing and initiation relations take the new variable i as their argument. Then, (42) is 
inserted into (41) and the result replaces the original term within (40), which 
yields the revised logical form in (43). The λ-conversion of v and π'' yields (44).  
(43) λe:CBI λπ ∃!d ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY.blanket(d, π) ˄ in the shade lie(e, d, π) 
˄ intention(r, z, d, ^[λv λe''.in the shade(e'', v)], π) ˄ [[λv λπ'' ∃i:ιυτ(BLANKET). bear-
ing(z, i, π'') ˄ initiation(e', i, e, π'') ˄ ϕιυτ(BLANKET)(i, v, π'')] (π ∗ ARG1
blanket
: ARTIFACT  ∗
 ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – ιυτ(BLANKET)) (d)]  
(44) λe:CBI λπ ∃!d ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY.blanket(d, π) ˄ in the shade lie(e, d, π) 
˄ intention(r, z, d, ^[λv λe''.in the shade lie(e'', v)], π) ˄ [∃i:ιυτ(BLANKET). bearing(z, i, 
                                                 
14
  As outlined, the attitude relation is not involved in the type conflict. Thus, the scope contains 
conflicting and non-conflicting terms. Asher (2011) does not specify any regularity for this 
case. Based on the assumption that type conflicts are solved locally and only conflicting terms 
undergo abstraction, the abstraction only affects the bearing relation and the initiation relation.  




: ARTIFACT  ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
: INITIATOR – ιυτ(BLANKET)) 
˄ initiation(e', i, e, π ∗ ARG1
blanket
: ARTIFACT  ∗ ARG2
bearing
: ATHA ∗ ARG2
initiation
:           
INITIATOR – ιυτ(BLANKET)) ˄ ϕιυτ(BLANKET)(i, d, π ∗ ARG1
blanket





: INITIATOR – ιυτ(BLANKET))] / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
Most importantly, the variables for the conflicting terms now differ; cf. d for 
picnic blanket and i for the bearing and initiation relations. The type conflict is 
resolved since d must justify ARTIFACT, while i must justify INITIATOR and ENTITY 
THAT IS ABLE TO HAVE ATTITUDES. This renders type justification successful; all 
type presuppositions can be bound; see (45). In prose: ‘There is an event e where 
the blanket d lies in the shade. At the same time, there is a state z in which an un-
derspecified initiator i who can make decisions regarding the picnic blanket d has 
the intention r that the picnic blanket d has the property of lying in the shade.’  
(45) λπ ∃e:CBI ∃!d:ARTIFACT ∃i:ιυτ(BLANKET) ∃r:ATT-OBJ ∃z:K-STATE ∃e':EVTY.   
blanket(d, π) ˄ in the shade lie(e, d, π) ˄ intention(r, z, d, ^[λv λe''.in the shade 
lie(e'', v)], π) ˄ bearing(z, i, π) ˄ initiation(e', i, e, π) ˄ ϕιυτ(blanket)(i, d, π) / τ(z) ⊃ τ(e) 
The following merits of the proposed type-logical analysis are noteworthy:  
(i) The type coercion does not specify the value of the interpolated variable; 
the logical form assigns the interpolated variable the underspecified value ϕ. This 
renders its identification amenable to conceptual knowledge. However, the varia-
ble is typed as ιυτ(BLANKET). This captures that the pragmatic identification of the 
attitude holder is restricted to the initiator of the described event and preserves the 
semantic requirements of absichtlich ‘intentionally’. The type coercion does not 
overrule selectional restrictions, but enables a different way to implement them.  
(ii) The coercion is spelled out as a non-destructive operation: the type con-
flict is solved by a variable that mediates between the incompatible terms. The 
coercion does not affect the type presuppositions associated with d; d must justify 
the original type presuppositions specified by die Picknickdecke ‘the picnic blan-
ket’. This captures that the blanket is still interpreted as an inanimate artifact. Fur-
thermore, the coercion adjust the computation of the conflicting terms locally. 
The introduced variable is existentially bound and is not passed on; the argument 
of the original target remains compositionally active. This captures the outlined 
locality effects. The analysis captures that the interpretation of the attitude is not 
adapted since its presuppositions do not conflict with those of the original target.  
(iii) The analysis captures that the coercion can be triggered by semantically 
and conceptually based incompatibilities. In TCL, typing information is – though 
rooted in the lexicon – context-sensitive and thus dynamic: type justification de-
pends on whether the corresponding entity going in for a variable can justify the 
presupposed type in a particular context. In general, a patient can justify the rele-
vant types: HUMAN required by der Patient ‘the patient’ and INITIATOR required 
by I-adverbials have a common meet; no type conflict results from the lexically 
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introduced type presuppositions. This allows a straightforward compositional in-
terpretation of the patient as the attitude holder, cf. (26). However, the conceptual 
knowledge associated with (25) suggests that the particular patient cannot be the 
initiator of the particular event. Thus, in (25), the patient cannot not justify the 
type INITIATOR and a conceptually induced type conflict arises. This type conflict 
triggers the type coercion and is solved in the exact same way as described above.  
(iv) The lexicalist approach is well equipped to handle the contrast between 
the subtypes: the coercion is conceived of as an additional interpretation option 
that is introduced by certain lexical items, namely I-adverbials. A-adverbials do 
not introduce a polymorphic type and thus do not allow type coercion.  
However, the differing coercive potential anchored in the lexical entries of 
MAAs can be motivated by independent conceptual assumptions concerning atti-
tudes (see Buscher 2018 for an in-depth discussion): as outlined above, the coer-
cion cannot neglect lexical requirements of MAAs. Hence, it must adhere to the 
restriction that the attitude has to exist at the same time as the described event. 
The conceptual knowledge associated with attitudes relating to goals ensures that 
the adjusted interpretation complies with this restriction: an intention exists as 
long as the goal is not achieved and it ceases when the goal is achieved. In (22), 
Maria has the aim to avoid a sunburn while she puts the picnic blanket into the 
shade and, moreover, while the blanket lies in the shade. Hence, it is conceptually 
plausible that her intention that the picnic blanket has the property of lying in the 
shade exists at the same as the blanket’s lying in the shade. In contrast, the con-
ceptual knowledge associated with attitudes relating to participation does not en-
sure that the adjusted interpretation complies with this restriction: the will to par-
ticipate in an event exists as long as the event proceeds and ceases when the event 
comes to an end. The will to participate in the event exists while Maria puts the 
picnic blanket into the shade, but it does not exist anymore while the blanket lies 
in the shade. Hence, in contrast to I-adverbials, A-adverbials lack an adequate 
conceptual backbone that is required for a successful implementation of coercion.  
In sum, this case study revealed three main characteristics of the interaction 
between compositional semantics and conceptual structures: (i) Selectional re-
strictions are sensitive to fine-grained dynamic conceptual knowledge. Therefore, 
type coercion can be triggered by semantically induced type conflicts but also by 
conceptually based type conflicts. (ii) Lexical precondition: lexical information 
determines which meaning parts can be adjusted by conceptual knowledge; the 
lexical entry thus licenses and restricts conceptual influences. (iii) Conceptual 
precondition: lexical semantics cannot be overruled by conceptual knowledge, but 
is implemented more flexible; an adequate conceptual backbone must ensure that 
all semantic requirements can be considered as fulfilled. Hence, recalcitrant data 
at the semantics pragmatics interface comply with compositionality if conceptual 
knowledge is adequately integrated within a compositional framework.  
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